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Abstract
It is well-known that a Hilbert-style deduction system for first-order classical logic is sound
and complete for a model theory built using all Boolean algebras as truth-value algebras if and
only if it is sound and complete for a model theory utilizing only irreducible Boolean algebras
(which are all isomorphic to the two-element Boolean algebra 2). In this paper, we prove an
analogous result for any first-order logic with an algebraic semantics satisfying certain minimal
assumptions, and we then apply our result to first-order quantum logic.
1 Introduction
While first-order classical logic is typically developed using the two element Boolean algebra 2
as its algebra of truth values, one obtains an equivalent logic by utilizing all Boolean algebras. More
specifically, a formal deduction system is sound and complete for a model theory built using 2 as the
truth value algebra if and only if it is sound and complete for a model theory utilizing all Boolean
algebras [1]. A Boolean algebra is irreducible if it is not isomorphic to a product of two Boolean
algebras, and 2 is the only non-trivial irreducible Boolean algebra (up to isomorphism). Hence, we
can re-state the above theorem as follows — a formal deduction system is sound and complete for
a model theory utilizing all Boolean algebras if and only if it is sound and complete for a model
theory utilizing only irreducible Boolean algebras.
There are many first-order logics other than classical which are naturally associated with a certain
class of algebras — some of these utilize the same syntactical structure as classical first-order logic
but change the axioms (e.g. quantum logic, intuitionistic logic, etc.), while others modify the relevant
set of logical connectives (e.g. modal logic, conditional logic, etc.). It is natural to wonder whether
an analogous result (to that for classical logic described above) concerning irreducible truth-value
algebras applies to any such non-classical logic. In this paper, we show that a first-order logic is
sound and complete with respect to a semantics based on a class of algebras K if and only if it
is sound and complete with respect to a semantics based on the irreducible algebras in K. The
only assumptions in our proof are that the universal quantifier is evaluated in the semantics via a
partial order on the algebras in K, and that the class of models defining the semantics is reasonably
well-behaved. (See below for a precise statement of our result.)
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce some preliminaries concerning
truth-value algebras and define our model theory. Following this, we prove our main result in
section 3. In section 4 we apply this result to quantum logic. Finally, in section 5 we note some
open questions.
* imbo@uic.edu
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2 Preliminary Material
2.1 Truth Values
We now discuss the truth values in the logics we consider, which will have both an order-theoretic
as well as an algebraic structure.
2.1.1 Posets
Recall that a poset (P,≤) is a set P along with a binary relation ≤ on P that is reflexive, anti-
symmetric, and transitive. For a given poset (P,≤), and for a given A ⊆ P , we will use ⋁A and
⋀A to represent the least upper bound and greatest lower bound for A, respectively (when such an
element exists), or alternatively we may use the notation ⋁a∈A a and ⋀a∈A a, depending on context.
For a poset P , ⋁P is called the top element (when it exists), and is denoted by 1 (when P is clear
from the context).
Given two posets (P1,≤1) and (P2,≤2), we call a map g ∶ P1 → P2 isotone if g(a) ≤2 g(b) for
all a, b ∈ P1 such that a ≤1 b. An isotone map g ∶ P1 → P2 will further be called continuous if, for
any A ⊆ P1 for which ⋀A exists, we have that ⋀g(A) exists,1 and moreover that ⋀g(A) = g(⋀A).
Finally, if the two posets above have top elements 11 and 12, respectively, the map g is called
top-preserving if g(11) = 12.
2.1.2 Universal Algebra
First, let N = {0,1,2, . . .}. A type is a pair (α, τ), where either α = {0,1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N,
or α = N, and where τ ∶ α → N is such that i ≤ j implies τ(i) ≥ τ(j) for all i, j ∈ α. An algebra
of type (α, τ) is then a tuple (A,O, ℓ), where A is a set, O is a finite or countably infinite set
(called the operations of the algebra), ℓ ∶ O → α is a bijective map (called the labeling function), and
f ∶ Aτ(ℓ(f)) → A for each f ∈ O.
For notational convenience, when both the algebra (A,O, ℓ) and its type (α, τ) are clear from
the context, for any f ∈ O we call Nf ∶= τ(ℓ(f)) the arity of f .
Note that for any two algebras (A1,O1, ℓ1) and (A2,O2, ℓ2) of the same type (α, τ), O1 andO2 are
naturally isomorphic (as sets) via the map2 ℓ−12 ○ ℓ1. Then, for algebras (A1,O1, ℓ1) and (A2,O2, ℓ2)
of the same type, we call a map g ∶ A1 → A2 an algebra homomorphism if, for every f ∈ O1, we have
that, g(f(a1, . . . , aNf )) = f˜(g(a1), . . . , g(aNf )) for all a1, . . . , aNf ∈ A1, where f˜ ∶= ℓ
−1
2
○ ℓ1(f).
2.1.3 Truth-value Algebras
We define a truth-value algebra of type (α, τ) to be a tuple (A,≤,O, ℓ) where (A,O, ℓ) is an algebra
of type (α, τ), and where (A,≤) is a poset with a top element. When α is a finite set with largest
element n, we simply say that the truth-value algebra is of type (τ(0), τ(1), . . . , τ(n)). Also, when
it will not lead to confusion, we will refer to the set A as the truth-value algebra.
Note that there is a trivial truth-value algebra (for any given type (α, τ)) consisting of the single
element 1, where every f ∈ O is the trivial map, and we denote this truth-value algebra by 1(α,τ),
or just by 1 when the type is clear from the context.
Boolean algebras are prototypical examples of truth-value algebras, having the type (2,2,1).
Explicitly, a Boolean algebra is a tuple (B,≤,O, ℓ), where O = {∧,∨,¬}, and where ℓ(∧) = 0, ℓ(∨) = 1
and ℓ(¬) = 2 (so that N∧ = N∨ = 2 and N¬ = 1). Typically, for a, b ∈ B, we write a ∧ b rather than
∧(a, b), and a ∨ b rather than ∨(a, b). The following constraints must be satisfied for all a, b, c ∈ B.
(i) ⋀{a, b} exists and a ∧ b = ⋀{a, b},
(ii) a ≤ b implies that ¬b ≤ ¬a,
(iii) ¬(¬a) = a,
1For any map g ∶ P1 → P2, we define the notation g(A) ∶= {g(a) ∶ a ∈ P1}.
2The symbol “○” denotes composition of maps.
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(iv) a ∨ ¬a = 1
(v) a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c).
The partial order then satisfies a ≤ b whenever a ∧ b = a for all a, b ∈ B. In addition to a top
element, B also has a bottom element 0 ∶= ¬1. 1 is easily seen to be a Boolean algebra. The smallest
non-trivial Boolean algebra consists of B = {0,1} with the standard operations, and we denote this
Boolean algebra by 2.
We will need to define a few simple notions concerning truth-value algebras. First, for truth-value
algebras (A1,≤1,O1, ℓ1) and (A2,≤2,O2, ℓ2) of the same type, a homomorphism is a map g ∶ A1 → A2
which is both an algebra homomorphism (from (A1,O1, ℓ1) to (A2,O2, ℓ2)), as well as an isotone,
continuous, and top-preserving map (from (A1,≤1) to (A2,≤2)). If a homomorphism is 1-1 and onto,
it is called an isomorphism, and whenever there exists some isomorphism g ∶ A1 → A2, then A1 and
A2 are said to be isomorphic (denoted A1 ≃ A2).
We also note that one can define products of truth-value algebras of the same type in the
usual way. Given two truth-value algebras (A1,≤1,O1, ℓ1) and (A2,≤2,O2, ℓ2), we can give the
(set theoretic) Cartesian product A1 × A2 the structure of a truth-value algebra (A1 × A2,≤,O, ℓ)
by defining (a1, a2) ≤ (b1, b2) exactly when a1 ≤1 b1 and a2 ≤2 b2, and for each f ∈ O1, (letting
f˜ ∶= ℓ−1
2
○ℓ1(f)) defining fˆ((a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (aNf , bNf )) ∶= (f(a1, . . . , aNf ), f˜(b1, . . . , bNf )). Then
we define O to be the collection of all such fˆ ’s (for f ∈ O1), and also set ℓ(fˆ) ∶= ℓ1(f).
Then, for any truth-value algebras A1 and A2 of the same type, we have A1 × A2 ≃ A2 × A1,
as well as that A × 1 ≃ A for any truth-value algebra A. Also, for A1 × A2, we have the natural
projection maps pi ∶ A1 ×A2 → Ai for i = 1,2, which behave as one expects.
Proposition 1. Let A1 and A2 be truth-value algebras of the same type. Then the projection maps
pi ∶ A1 ×A2 → Ai for i = 1,2 are both homomorphisms.
Proof. The only non-trivial property to prove is the continuity of pi, so consider S ⊆ A1 ×A2 such
that ⋀S exists, and define (a, b) ∶= ⋀S. We consider p1, the proof for p2 is similar.
Now, for all (c, d) ∈ S, we have that (a, b) ≤ (c, d), and hence a ≤ c, so that a is a lower bound
for the set of all c such that (c, d) ∈ S for some d ∈ A2 (i.e. for p1(S)). Also, for any c′ ∈ A1 which
is a lower bound for p1(S), we have that (c′, b) ≤ (c, d) for all (c, d) ∈ S, and hence (c′, b) ≤ (a, b), so
that c′ ≤ a. Hence a is the greatest lower bound for p1(S), i.e. p1(⋀S) = ⋀p1(S).
The following concept will be central in what follows.
Definition 1. Let A be a truth-value algebra. Then A is said to be irreducible if whenever
A ≃ A1 × A2, we have that either A1 ≃ 1 or A2 ≃ 1.
2.2 First-Order Algebraic Logic
2.2.1 Syntax
The syntax we use for first-order algebraic logic is similar to that typically used for first-order
classical logic, the only difference is that the propositional logical connectives may be different.
First, fix a type T = (α, τ). We define a T -language L to consist of a set of predicate, function,
and propositional connective symbols, which we assume are disjoint and denote by LP , LF , and
LC , respectively, so that L = LP ∪ LF ∪ LC , and where LC is in 1-1 correspondence with α. Each
element of a T -language has an associated non-negative integer, called its arity (functions of arity 0
are said to be constants), and the arity of a given logical connective ci ∈ LC (corresponding to i ∈ α)
is defined to be τ(i).
We define our variables to run over some countable set, and use the symbols x, y, z, x1, x2, . . . as
meta-variables, i.e. variables which each stand for some variable in our aforementioned countable
set. We then define L-terms in the standard way starting with variables and constants as atomic
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terms and proceeding inductively using function symbols of higher arity. Similarly, we define well-
formed formulas for a given language L (which we call L-wffs) inductively using the propositional
connectives along with the universal quantifier “∀” in the standard manner.3
We also use the usual notion of free and bound variables, and for an L-wff ψ, we write ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
to mean that the free variables occurring in ψ are among x1, . . . , xn (although not all of them may ac-
tually occur free in ψ). For an n-tuple of constants (a1, . . . , an), we then write ψ(a1, . . . , an) for that
L-wff which is obtained from ψ by substituting ai for each free occurrence of xi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If an L-wff has no free variables, we say that it is an L-sentence.
2.2.2 Models for Algebraic Logic
For any T -language L, we define an L-structure for algebraic logic in a fashion analogous to that
for classical logic, except that we allow any truth-value algebra of type T to serve as the allowed
truth values, rather than any Boolean algebra (or just 2, depending on the particular development
of classical logic).
In order to accomplish this definition, we first need a language rich enough to refer to elements
of a given structure. To this end, given a T -language L, and a set M (disjoint from L), we define
LM to be the T -language given by L∪M , where each element ofM is taken to be a function symbol
of arity 0 (i.e. a constant). Note that since L ⊆ LM , every L-wff is an LM -wff. Next, we need to
interpret our function symbols as actual maps in our models, which motivates the following notion.
For a given language L, associated function symbols LF , and a given set M , an interpretation of
L in M is a map which assigns to each function symbol f ∈ LF of arity n a map from Mn → M .
Note that if F is an interpretation of L in M , we can always extend F to an interpretation of LM
in M by taking F (a) = a for each a ∈ M . Whenever necessary in the sequel, we will consider F to
be so extended without further comment. Then, given any LM -term t containing no variables, we
can map this term to M in the usual way, which we denote by F (t).
Finally, we need to assign truth values (elements of a given truth-value algebra A) to our LM -
wffs. In order to do this in a way which respects the usual meaning of our logical connectives we
make the following definition.
Definition 2. Let L be a T -language, A a truth-value algebra with labeling function ℓ, M a set,
and F an interpretation of L in M . Then a truth valuation for F in A is a surjective4 map ν from
the set of LM -sentences to A which satisfies the following properties:
(1) ν(P (t1, . . . , tn)) = ν(P (F (t1), . . . , F (tn))) for any predicate P ∈ LP of arity n and LM -terms
t1, . . . , tn with no variables;
(2) ν(ci(ψ1, . . . , ψn)) = fi(ν(ψ1), . . . , ν(ψn)) for any connective ci ∈ LC of arity n, where fi = ℓ−1(i),
and for any LM -sentences ψ1, . . . , ψn;
(3) Whenever ⋀
a∈M
ν(ψ(a)) exists for a given LM -wff ψ(x), we have that
ν((∀x)ψ(x)) = ⋀
a∈M
ν(ψ(a));
(4) ⋀
a∈M
ν(ψ(a)) exists for any LM -wff ψ(x).
(The break-up of statements (3) and (4) above may seem odd — we do this for ease of reference in
the sequel.) We can then define ν(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) = ν((∀x1)⋯(∀xn)ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) for any LM -wff
ψ, thus, extending ν to all LM -wffs. We will always consider our truth valuations to be so extended.
3We restrict our attention to first-order logics where the existential quantifier “∃” only occurs as a defined symbol;
for example, in standard first-order logic with Boolean connectives, ∃ ∶= ¬∀¬ . One could extend the results of this
paper to first-order logics with “∃” defined independently by using analogous constraints involving least upper bounds
wherever we have used greatest lower bounds in order to deal with “∀”.
4We could have equally well proceeded to develop our model theory without the condition of surjectivity — however
this assumption will streamline some of the presentation in the sequel.
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For any T -language L, we now define an L-structure to be a tuple (M,A,ν,F ) where M is a set
(called the universe), A is a truth-value algebra of type T , F is an interpretation of L in M , and ν
is a truth valuation for F in A. Then, given a set of L-wffs Γ, and an L-structure M ∶= (M,A,ν,F ),
we say that M is a model for Γ if ν(γ(a1, . . . , an)) = 1 for every γ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Γ and a1, . . . , an ∈M .
For any L-structure M with truth valuation ν, we will say that an L-wff γ holds in M (or write
M ⊧ γ) if ν(γ) = 1. This means that M is a model of Γ if and only if every γ ∈ Γ holds in M. In
what follows, we will be particularly interested in models for which A is an irreducible truth-value
algebra, motivating the following definition.
Definition 3. Let L be a T -language, and let M be an L-structure. If the truth-value algebra of
M is irreducible, then M is called an irreducible L-structure (or irreducible model, if M is a model).
The truth of a given L-wff will be decided with respect to an allowed class of models, which
motivates the formal notion of a semantics for a logic.
Definition 4. Let L be a T -language, and let T be a class of L-structures. Then T is said to be
an L-semantics.
Whenever a given model (or structure) has a product truth-value algebra, we can use the natural
projection maps on the truth-value algebras to construct new models (or structures).
Proposition 2. Let L be a T -language, let Γ be a set of L-wffs, and let M = (M,A1 × A2, ν,F )
(where A1,A2 are both truth-value algebras of type T ) be a model of Γ. Then Mi ∶= (M,Ai, pi○ν,F )
is a model of Γ, where pi ∶ A1 ×A2 → Ai is the natural projection map onto Ai (with i = 1,2).
Proof. For any γ ∈ Γ, ν(γ) = 1 (since M is a model of Γ), and so pi ○ ν(γ) = 1 (the top element
of A1 × A2 is easily seen to be (1,1)). Also, since ν and pi are both surjective, pi ○ ν is also
surjective. Moreover, conditions (1)-(3) of def. 2 are satisfied since ν is a truth valuation and pi is
a homomorphism. It remains to show only that pi ○ ν satisfies condition (4) of that same definition.
To this end, consider an L-wff ψ(x), and let (γ, β) = ⋀a∈M ν(ψ(a)). Since pi is a homomorphism
(proposition 1), it is, in particular, continuous, and hence γ is the greatest lower bound for the set
{pi ○ ν(ψ(a)) ∶ a ∈M}, establishing condition (4) of def. 2.
With this in mind, one natural property that an L-semantics can possess is the following:
Definition 5. Let L be a T -language, and let T be an L-semantics. Then T is said to be factor-
closed when for every L-structure (M,A1 ×A2, ν,F ) ∈ T , we have that both (M,A1, p1 ○ ν,F ) and
(M,A2, p2 ○ ν,F ) are in T , where pi ∶ A1 ×A2 → Ai (for i = 1,2) are the natural projection maps.
2.2.3 Formal Deduction for Algebraic Logic
For a given T -language L, an L-rule is a pair (Γ, γ), where Γ is a finite set of L-wffs, and γ is a
single L-wff. This is a formalization of the idea that “γ follows from Γ”. A formal deduction system
for L is then a pair (A,R), where A is a set of L-wffs (representing “logical axioms”), and L is a
set of L-rules (the “rules of inference”).
A formal proof in a given formal deduction system (A,R) from Γ (where Γ is a set of L-wffs,
representing the hypotheses of the proof) is then a finite tuple (γ1, . . . , γn) of L-wffs such that, for
each γi, i = 1, . . . , n, we have either (i) γi ∈ A ∪ Γ, or (ii) there exists a set Γ0 ⊆ {γ1, . . . , γi−1} for
which (Γ0, γi) ∈ R. If a formal proof for γ in a deduction system D exists from some set of L-wffs
Γ, we write Γ ⊢ γ (where we eschew a D-dependent notation since the deduction system will always
be clear from the context). We now formally define the notions of soundness and completeness for
our logics.
Definition 6. Let L be a T -language, let T be an L-semantics, and let D be a formal deduction
system for L.
1. D is said to be complete for T if, for any set of L-wffs Γ, whenever ψ is an L-wff satisfying
M ⊧ ψ for every M ∈ T which is an L-model of Γ, we have Γ ⊢ ψ.
2. D is said to be sound for T if, for any set of L-wffs Γ, whenever ψ is an L-wff satisfying Γ ⊢ ψ,
then for any model M ∈ T of Γ, we have that M ⊧ ψ.
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3 Main Theorem
We will now prove our main result.
Main Theorem. Let L be a T -language, let T be an L-semantics which is factor-closed, and let
there exist some formal deduction system D which is both sound and complete for T . Further let Γ
be a set of L-wffs, and let ψ be an L-wff which holds in every irreducible model of Γ which is in T .
Then ψ holds in every model of Γ which is in T .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, so let ψ be an L-wff and assume that there is some model of
Γ in T in which ψ does not hold. We will show that there is some irreducible model of Γ in T in
which ψ does not hold.
By the assumption of completeness, we must have that Γ does not prove ψ in D. Now define
SΓ to be the set which consists of exactly those sets of L-wffs Φ which satisfy both (i) Γ ⊆ Φ, and
(ii) ν(ψ) ≠ 1 for some truth valuation ν in some model of Φ which is in T . Clearly SΓ is non-empty.
SΓ, like any set of sets, is partially ordered by inclusion, and we will use Zorn’s lemma to prove
that SΓ contains some maximal element Ω. Let C ⊆ SΓ be linearly ordered under inclusion, and
define U ∶= ⋃c∈C c. Clearly U is an upper bound for C under inclusion, so it suffices to show that
U ∈ SΓ. Property (i) which defines SΓ clearly holds, since trivially Γ ⊆ U . We prove property (ii)
by contradiction, so assume ν(ψ) = 1 for every truth valuation ν in every model of U , and hence
U ⊢ ψ by the completeness of D. The formal proof of U ⊢ ψ is finite by definition, and so may only
contain a finite number of L-wffs γ1, γ2, . . . , γn ∈ U , where each γi ∈ Φi for some Φi ∈ C. Since C
is linearly ordered by inclusion, we must have that ⋃ni=1Φi = Φj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and since
{γ1, . . . , γn} ⊆ Φj , we have that Φj ⊢ ψ, so that, by the soundness of D, ν(ψ) = 1 for every truth
valuation ν in every model of Φj , which is a contradiction since Φj ∈ SΓ. Hence we must have that
U ∈ SΓ, and since C was an arbitrary chain in SΓ, Zorn’s lemma gives that SΓ has a maximal element
Ω.
Since Ω ∈ SΓ, there exists a model M ∶= (M,A,ν,F ) of Ω in T in which ν(ψ) ≠ 1. We claim
that the truth-value algebra A in this model is irreducible. Assume not, so that A ≃ A1 ×A2 with
both A1,A2 non-trivial. By proposition 2, this produces two new models of Ω with corresponding
truth-value algebras A1 and A2 (and truth valuations ν1 ∶= p1 ○ ν and ν2 ∶= p2 ○ ν, respectively). Of
course, these models are both in T , since T is factor-closed. Since ν(ψ) ≠ 1, we must have (without
loss of generality) ν1(ψ) ≠ 1. Let χ be some L-wff such that ν1(χ) = 1 and ν2(χ) ≠ 1. Clearly, χ ∉ Ω,
since ν(χ) ≠ 1. Now, we cannot have Ω ∪ {χ} ⊢ ψ, since then we would have ν1(ψ) = 1. Hence, we
must have that Ω∪ {χ} ∈ SΓ, but this means that Ω is a proper subset of Ω∪ {χ}, which contradicts
the maximality of Ω in SΓ. Hence, we must have that A is irreducible. This shows that M is an
irreducible model of Γ in which ν(ψ) ≠ 1.
So we see that for any first-order algebraic logic (as defined in section 2.2) which is formulated
with respect to a factor-closed class of algebras, a Hilbert-style deduction system is sound and
complete for that class of algebras if and only if it is sound and complete for the irreducible algebras
in that class. In particular, this result applies to quantum logic, to which we now turn our attention.
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4 First-Order Quantum Logics
Any first-order quantum logic (at least as considered in this paper) is defined through its model
theory, and the model theory is entirely analogous to that of classical logic, except that any fixed
variety of orthomodular lattices is allowed to serve as the class of truth-value algebras as opposed
to only Boolean algebras [2, 3]. In section 4.1 we briefly discuss orthomodular lattices (see [4]), and
in section 4.2 we precisely define first-order quantum logics and apply our main theorem.
4.1 Orthomodular Lattices
An orthomodular lattice is a tuple (L,≤,O, ℓ), where (L,≤) is a poset with a top element, O =
{∧,∨,¬}, and ℓ(∧) = 0, ℓ(∨) = 1 and ℓ(¬) = 2 (so that N∧ = N∨ = 2 and N¬ = 1, i.e. orthomodular
lattices have type (2,2,1)). Additionally, the following constraints5 must be satisfied for all a, b ∈ L.
(i) ⋀{a, b} exists and a ∧ b = ⋀{a, b},
(ii) a ≤ b implies that ¬b ≤ ¬a,
(iii) ¬(¬a) = a,
(iv) a ∨ ¬a = 1
(v) a ≤ b implies a ∨ (¬a ∧ b) = b.
Boolean algebras are special cases of orthomodular lattices — to wit, Boolean algebras are exactly
the orthomodular lattices (L,≤,O, ℓ) in which all pairs of elements are compatible, i.e. for all a, b ∈ L,
(vi) a = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b).
In particular, both 1 and 2 are orthomodular lattices.
In an orthomodular lattice L, the center of L (denoted Z(L)) is the subset of L consisting of
elements of L which are compatible with every element in L. Note that for any orthomodular lattice
L, Z(L) is a Boolean sub-algebra of L. A characterization of irreducibility in orthomodular lattices
is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then L is irreducible if and only if Z(L) = {0,1}.
This is to say that the irreducible orthomodular lattices are exactly those orthomodular lattices
which have, as their center, the only irreducible Boolean algebra 2.
4.2 Irreducibles Suffice for Quantum Logic
For a given quantum logic, we fix type (2,2,1), where LC = {∧,∨,¬},6 and we let V denote the variety
of orthomodular lattices with which the quantum logic is associated. In this context, the relevant
L-structures are those tuples (M,L, ν,F ) (as defined in section 2.2.2), where the truth-value algebra
L is an orthomodular lattice; models are defined analogously — for the full details see [5, 6]. Per
definition 3, an L-structure is irreducible exactly when the truth-value algebra L is an irreducible
orthomodular lattice. We obtain an L-semantics TV for the quantum logic by taking TV to be the
class of L-structures such that the truth-value algebras run over all orthomodular lattices in V . (If
V is just the variety of Boolean algebras, this yields classical logic.) Note that any variety is closed
under homomorphic images (by Birkhoff’s HSP theorem [7]); as such, we have that TV is factor
closed. In 1974 Dishkant constructed a formal deduction system for a quantum logic based on the
variety V consisting of all orthomodular lattices, and he demonstrated that it was both sound and
complete for TV [2]; an alternative system was provided in [8, 5, 6]. An analogous result can easily
be seen to hold for any variety of orthomodular lattices.
5If only (ii)-(iii) are satisfied, L is called an involutive lattice, while if (ii)-(iv) are satisfied, it is called an ortholattice.
6We use the same symbols for the logical connectives as for operations in orthomodular lattices, but no confusion
should result.
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Now, since a given quantum logic satisfies the assumptions of the Main Theorem, we see that a
formal deduction system is both sound and complete for TV if and only if it is sound and complete
for a semantics T 0V utilizing only irreducible orthomodular lattices in V . Note, in particular, that
each truth-value algebra L0 associated with a model in T 0V has Z(L0) = 2, so that taking V to be
the variety of orthomodular lattices consisting of Boolean algebras, we recover exactly the original
theorem (stated in section 1) for classical logic.
Clearly, our Main Theorem greatly simplifies investigations into the model theory of any quantum
logic, as it allows one to focus solely on irreducible orthomodular lattices in V , rather than all of V .
We note that the projection lattice of a (separable) Hilbert space of any given dimension (even
infinite) is an irreducible orthomodular lattice, and the primary reason for interest in logics based
on projection lattices stems from their relevance to quantum theory itself [3]. For some concrete
applications of our result to the development of mathematics based on quantum logic — in particular
set theory and arithmetic — see [8, 5, 6].
5 Open Questions
Just as we have proved a more powerful completeness result allowing the restriction of our semantics
to irreducible models, we would like to know if there are other sub-classes of models for which an
analogous completeness result holds. In the classical case, we have completeness with respect to
the single Boolean algebra 2, and this algebra satisfies other properties besides irreducibility, such
as being subdirectly irreducible [7] and being a complete lattice with respect to the partial order.
We would like to know which of our first-order algebraic logics are complete with respect to models
whose truth-value algebras are either all subdirectly irreducible or all complete lattices, just as they
are with respect to irreducible models.
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